Figure 2 shows that, in eight of the eleven years of the 2000-2010 period, the budgetary contributions to public universities settled under the law 30 grew less than the growth of the economy. In the three remaining years, they grew up above. The latter is a manifestation of his advantage from the point of view of the maximum budget allocations.Meanwhile, recurrent budgetary contributions settled under rule provided for in the Government’s proposal is would have increased, in all cases, below economic growth. This evidence its disadvantage in terms of maximum allocations. However, it is observed that, in contrast with the law 30, the reform proposal does not lead to growth rates real negative contributions. More information is housed here: Tony Parker. This would be a manifestation of its advantage in terms of minimum allocations. Castles of sand? Funding schemes associated both to the draft reform Act 30 have serious design faults, since they tend to ignore the characteristics and behavior of the recurrent expenditures and are not designed to accommodate the needs of investment, more in circumstances in which you want to extend the coverage and improve the quality of higher education. Learn more about this with Sohn Conference. None of the two schemas handles, for example, the notion of standardized recurrent expenditures, which has been gaining ground in the literature on these topics.
Behind the project seems to be two excessive biases: one against bid and other funding in favour of the financing of demand (e.g., credits and subsidies). The key word in this case is excessive. It has no note that public universities can not be created or liquidate, enlarge or reduce, following to the letter the fluctuations of demand.It requires a significant degree of independence (not total independence) from changing demand conditions, with a view to ensuring the continuity and stability of educational institutions. And that means grant funding to offer, represented in recurring expenses.Between the College estates, the initiatives of the Government on financing of public higher education tend to view with suspicion: behind this or that proposal lies, reportedly often desire to privatize State University so that their activities are governed by the whims of the market, or do you IACHR due to lack of budgetary resources. Sometimes this suspicion is unfounded; others, however, the Wolf’s ears loom in government projects.Mutual distrust has stretched the agreements on the sustainable financing of higher public education among society, represented by the political institutions, and university levels. In a decidedly imperfect metaphor, today the public University resembles in some respects, to ice cream that melts while interested parties discussed, sometimes bellicose manner, how to pay the treat.